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TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
FOUO No. 624

AFRICA

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

AFRICA IN 1978 REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Jan 79 pp 115-118

[Article by Jean Gueneau]

[Text] In spite of appearances, the year of 1978 will perhaps be recorded in history as the year which saw the beginning of the consolidation and enforcement of African cohesion, its ability to settle its interior problems by itself and the beginning of an emergence to a return to civil government.

There is no doubt that Africa is still the scene of too many armed conflicts or of conflicts which may generate into wars. Tension is still acute between Ethiopia and Somalia, which ascribe warlike intentions to each other. Chad is still the theater of operations of a war. The northern part of its territory is still subject to claims by Libya, while the Western Sahara is still a bone of contention between Morocco and Algeria. During the same year, in the final weeks, the armies of Tanzania and Uganda were facing each other in the Kagera region.

However, it is necessary to observe that those conflicts, of which certain ones had already begun before 1978, were limited and did not bring about foreign intervention other than counsels of moderation, as was the case on the part of the Carter administration after the reconquest of Ogaden. The Ethiopian army then stopped on the border and it is probable that, if its territory had then been invaded, Somalia would have found among the western powers the military and diplomatic support which it did not have while in the eyes of international observers and governments it appeared to be an aggressor in violation of the principle of the inviolability of borders, although, like Eritrea, it was a victim of Ethiopian imperialism.

Localized Conflicts

In Chad, it is true that France is supplying troops at the request of General Malloum, but it may be doubted that French policy is being used to give the legitimate Chadian government the time and the means to resist the pressure of nationalist forces supported and armed by a foreign power, in view of the

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negotiated political settlement aiming at a national reconciliation where the entry of Hissene Habre into the national government was the first step.

After having thrown the weight of its "Jaguars" into the scales, France came back to a policy of complete neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict and uses the influence that it has kept among all the interested parties to favor contacts and to ease the search for a negotiated settlement which still demands long and patient negotiations.

The intervention of foreign military forces on the African continent, the French and Belgian paratroopers in Shaba, with American logistical support, was a limited operation as far as its objectives were concerned and within the time available. As soon as they were relieved by African contingents, the European troops left Zaire. The pressure of the westerners contributed to reconciliation and to the reestablishment of normal relations between Zaire and Angola, permitting the return to Shaba of several tens of thousands of refugees.

In the same way the joint efforts of the OAU and the westerners succeeded in limiting those conflicts and in avoiding the destabilization of the continent. At the same time the moderate stance of President Nyerere was able to limit the consequences of the disagreement which set his country against Marshall Idi Amin Dada's Uganda.

Without a doubt Africa hopes that the OAU will turn out to be more effective. This organization may become so as is witnessed by the success that it has had with its new president, Gen Gaafar El Mineiry, as we see that his sole competence was recognized in the problem of the Western Sahara when he thus avoided the internationalization of the conflict. However, the African organization still does not have the moral autonomy which would allow it to have greater weight on the African scene and internationally. It would be necessary for it to be thoroughly reorganized in order to protect itself from reproaches like those just made by the president of Tanzania, who accused it of behaving basically like a club of chiefs of state who only wish to keep themselves in power and not to consider as aggression any action but those which come from powers outside Africa. However imperfect it may be, the OAU in spite of everything is still the privileged forum for the peaceful arrangement of inter-African differences, and its possibilities for action may become stronger as a result of the greater and greater influence shown by states like Nigeria, Sudan, Algeria, Senegal, Ivory Coast and others, both inside and outside Africa, whether because of their economic influence or because of the reputation growing out of the wisdom of their leaders.

Return to Civilian Regimes

On the state level, Africa has given the proof that 20 years after independence, most states have acquired sufficiently solid institutions so that the military regimes which have resulted from coups d'etat are returning power to civilians. Others are bearing up under the shock of leaders as prestigious as Jomo Kenyatta and Houari Bumediene disappearing from the scene. Both in Kenya and

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in Nigeria the continuity of power has been assured without domestic trouble and with due regard to constitutional rules. It may be thought that it will be the same in the states directed by the "historical leaders" who achieved power at the same time their countries achieved independence.

Ghana, whose population, consulted in a referendum in 1978, adopted the project of a union government, should get back a civilian government in July of 1979. One month later, in Nigeria, a civil government will follow the military government of General Obasanjo as a result of elections in which the five officially recognized political parties will have competed.

In Rwanda, Gen Juvenal Habyarimana, elected president of the Republic, has had a new constitution adopted to replace the one which he had suspended after he took power, thereby returning the country to normal rule.

Mali should also get back a civilian regime in the middle of 1979. The return to civilian government is included in the constitution of 1974. In Upper Volta the last stage of the process of returning to democratic institutions was achieved in 1978 with legislative and presidential elections fairly won by General Lamizana, who triumphed over two opponents, and by his party which had to wage a hard election campaign against the two opposition parties.

One indication of the consideration granted to the African continent by the great powers has been given by the visits of their leaders. The year of 1978 saw for the first time the president of the United States pay an official visit to sub-Saharan Africa with the trip of President Carter to Nigeria and Liberia. The vice president of China made official journeys to Somalia, Egypt, Zaire, Nigeria and Ghana. The president of the French Republic went to Ivory Coast at the beginning of 1978, and recently to Guinea. At the same time French diplomacy is trying to extend its field of activity to the English-speaking and Portuguese-speaking states of eastern and western Africa.

Two conflicts were carried on in Africa in 1978. In these conflicts, although they were of different kinds, the relationships between the forces, foreign intervention and the interest in the outcomes are such that the OAU and the African states cannot expect a peaceful resolution from them without the collaboration of the international community, particularly of the UN. These are the Eritrean war and the decolonization of southern Africa.

The enormity of the resources, both in men and in material, put by the Soviet Union (whose generals are in command of the operations) at the disposition of Ethiopia in order to attempt to reduce the resistance of Eritrea, annexed by Emperor Haile Selassie in spite of the resolutions of the UN and which has been struggling for its liberty for 18 years, sufficiently indicate that this undiminished war is now part of the much broader framework of the confrontation of the super-powers in the east. It is a question for the Soviet Union of assuring itself bases for its fleet and its aviation in order to control access to the Red Sea. The Eritrean war and the genocide of the Eritrean people are part of a vast manoeuvre to encircle the principal sources of

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petroleum for the West. Thus, to a great degree, they are more than an Inter-African conflict.

Seven African Worries

However, it is in southern Africa that the stability of the African continent is most threatened.

In Rhodesia, the agreement on an internal solution and the creation of the interim government have not been enough to disarm the opposition of the Patriotic Front. The perspectives of the Anglo-Saxon plan of solution are becoming more and more distant every day, and 90 percent of the territory of Rhodesia is today under martial law. The consequences of this situation are fearful for the neighbours of Rhodesia, who on their own ground suffer from the belligerent measures carried out by the Rhodesian Army, and who see their economies severely tried. As a result the chances of a settlement negotiated among all the parties appear to them completely compromised to the point where the president of Tanzania has officially authorized the movement of troops by Great Britain in order to take back its control of Rhodesia and impose the application of its plan.

It is from the point of view of the support that would be demanded of it by the liberation movements or by one or the other of the "front-line" countries that the Soviet Union could be tempted to play a role in southern Africa and to consolidate its influence there. Another possibility might be opened to it if the western powers do not succeed in getting South Africa's approval of the UN plan for Namibian independence. It is obvious in fact that Angola will continue to feel threatened as long as its southern border is open to the risk of intervention by the South African Army.

In such a hypothetical situation, as well as in the eyes of international law, the Soviet Union (or Cuba) would be diplomatically justified in responding to a request for assistance from a sovereign African state. The western powers would see their credibility ruined for a long time and would see their influence decline. Most of the African states are in fact convinced -- and it is their conviction which is important, even though it is unfounded -- that the westerners, lead by the United States, are engaged in a worldwide negotiation with the Soviet Union and are in a position to apply pressure. This pressure would be enough to determine constraints on South Africa to force it to respect the UN's decisions. In African eyes, only the solidarity among white people and the defense of their economic interests in Rhodesia and in the Republic of South Africa keep the western powers from adopting the sanctions demanded in the UN by the African group.

The key to solving the situation in South Africa is Pretoria, whose economic support is indispensable for the white regime in Salisbury if it is to remain in power. Only South Africa's abandonment of its policy of apartheid and a rise to power by the black majority in a multi-racial state where the whites and the mixed bloods would see their security and a fair place in the economy

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guaranteed, while ensuring a peaceful transition, would spare southern Africa the trauma of a transfer of power in Rhodesia and South Africa accompanied by the horrors of civil war and the ruin of the already developed economies. Zimbabwe and South Africa (or Azania) would then start their independence with a secure productive apparatus and they could continue to profit from the competence of the white advisors and technicians who might stay there, instead of condemning themselves to a massive exodus whose first symptoms are already appearing in Rhodesia.

Although it is the opposite of the situation in Ethiopia, which seems to be irreversible in the immediate future, there is still time for South Africa and Rhodesia to change the course of events. However, it is at this moment improbable that Pretoria and Salisbury will spontaneously accept a radical modification of their present policy. The western powers should then continue their efforts of persuasion with the Rhodesian and South African governments and facilitate the necessary negotiations and transitions. It is probably by their actions in this realm that Africa will judge their sincerity, and the relations of certain ones among them with Africa for the next 20 years may depend on this judgment.

Peace Zones, Regional Cooperation

However, some zones of peace do exist on the continent. Specifically, this has been the case in West Africa for more than eight years, in other words since the Biafra war. The 16 states of the West Africa States Economic Community [CEDEAO] are aware that it is up to them to hold off the ambitions or the appetites of the great powers, and they have in mind signing a defense pact. Senegal and Ivory Coast were the first to broach the idea, which was then adopted by the member states of the West African Economic Community [CEAO] and today by Nigeria. If the project is brought to its conclusion, and if CEDEAO can find the means to make the independence and the interior stability of its members respected, then it will have achieved one of its objectives with the departure of the French troops who are still stationed there. France will not be opposed to their withdrawal. However, France will also be in a condition to request the progressive departure of all the foreign troops scattered over the rest of Africa.

It will not only have eliminated the tensions aroused by the drawing of borders among its members, but it will little by little be able to constitute itself into a political entity able to make itself respected as such in African and international affairs. And above all it will offer, it already offers a model to the rest of Africa. In fact, it is in the constitution of great regional groups and subregional groups that Africa will find the best chances for its development by transcending the problem of borders and by constructing the great infrastructures that it needs, in particular dams on the great rivers like the Niger and the Senegal. These dams will give it control over its water and will assure it energy resources.

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From this point of view, West Africa must congratulate itself that the year of 1978 saw the reconciliation of Guinea with Senegal, Ivory Coast and France. The cohesion of CEDEAO is made firmer as a result, as the cohesion of the whole of the African continent is made easier by the daily functioning of regional and subregional institutions like CEAO, the Mano River Organization, the Council of Entente, the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa, OCAM, the Great Lakes Community and so many others.

Without any doubt the world's attention is less aroused by the peaceful accomplishments that have been carried on with perseverance in the heart of these inter-African organizations than by the more spectacular armed conflicts. However, the patient work which is accomplished there each day is a witness to the strengthening of the solidarity of African states in the west and in the center of the continent, between the white Africa on the Mediterranean and the tortured south of Africa. Africa certainly hopes that the countries which formerly constituted the Economic Community of East Africa will also recover an understanding of their mutual destiny.

There is no doubt that Africa also experienced coups d'etat or palace revolutions in 1978. In Mauritania, Col Mustapha Ould Mohamed Saleck, army chief of staff, overthrew the civil regime of President Moktar Ould Daddah. In Ghana, General Akuffo replaced Gen Acheampong and in the Comoros Mohamed ben Abdallah seized power from Ali Soilih. Paradoxically, it seems quite likely that Gen Acheampong may have been the victim of his own twistings and turnings in reestablishing civil power. In Mauritania, the coup d'etat seems to have been motivated by a wish to get out of a dead-end situation in the Western Sahara business, by a certain discontent in the Mauritanian army due to the presence of the Moroccan army, considered to be too preponderant, and finally by a very poor economic situation further aggravated by the drought.

In the Comoros the coup d'etat was followed by elections and the new government is trying to reestablish the state structures which were completely disorganized by the previous regime.

Naturally the African states are not all undergoing reforms to the same extent as Senegal, which has just authorized the creation of a fourth party, Upper Volta or others in parliamentary democracy founded on party pluralism, a system which moreover presupposes the existence of a certain number of conditions which have not been satisfied everywhere. This system furthermore is not the best adapted to African realities. However, it is significant to observe in Africa, in 1978, the good record of the institutions in the countries where the succession of chiefs of state of great prestige was to be assured, and to witness a confirmation of the tendency to return to regimes offering to the people the possibility of participating in public affairs and of having a certain control over political life, which are promises of stability for the future.

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Economic Development, Political Options

The daily cooperation of the states in the framework of their great regional and subregional organizations and the reinforcement of their internal cohesion should permit Africa to concentrate on its essential problem, that of its development and its economic independence. As it comes of age, Africa can free itself of overwhelming tutelage and choose its economic partners as a function of its interests alone.

The contracts signed in 1978 by the Moroccan monarchy with the Soviet Union and by socialistic Algeria with the great capitalistic American oil companies show at the same time the possibility for states assured of their solidity to plan long-term economic projects with partners which have radically opposed political regimes, without for that reason renouncing their own political options, and emphasize the prudence with which it is necessary to consider the rather simplistic classification of African states into capitalistic, socialistic, conservative or progressive which is so often taken for granted in the West. They also demonstrate that in the competition between East and West and even inside each camp the economic criteria are those that will be decisive in the future.

Angola's opening toward the West in 1978, for example, allows one to think that the Soviet Union, hindered by its own development or by other reasons of its own, in particular its technological backwardness in certain sectors, is not in condition to give an effective response to all the requests of the African states. It is quite possible that in the realm of cooperation Africa feels resentment toward the nature of Soviet aid -- the most expensive in the world according to Syaad Barre, the president of Somalia -- and certain demands for the lion's share. It is certain that in 1978, as in earlier years, it was in the countries of the OCDE (Cooperation and Economic Development Organization), followed by the Arab oil-producing states, that Africa as a whole has found their most important public aid as well as the capital and the partners ready to associate with it in joint ventures, or to run the risk of private investments.

North-South Dialogue Difficult

It is also certain that the public aid from the OCDE countries, even taking into account the increase in liberality and in debt forgiving by some industrialized countries to the more poorly favored countries of Africa, was still insufficient in 1978 and below the objectives accepted by the western governments. It is still necessary to observe that among the African states, certain ones have not yet reached a level of development which would permit them to absorb larger amounts of aid, and that not all of them have been able to use the aid that they have received in the most effective way, which is to say as a function of clearly defined priorities aiming at real development and the satisfaction of the real needs of their populations. It is also necessary for the industrialized countries to accept the consideration that if aid is and will remain for a long time yet indispensable to Africa, the

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real foundation for the development of the whole of the Third World should be sought also in constructing an international economic order on more equitable foundations and in the completion of the negotiations of the famous north-south dialogue. From that point of view the year of 1978 will have been a disappointment for Africa and for all developing countries.

In Geneva the negotiations on the program concerning raw materials has hardly advanced at all. They have come to a dead-end specifically on stabilization funds for raw materials. In the same way the drawing up of a "code of conduct" for transfers of technology under the aegis of UNCTAD has turned out to be a delicate task and it has revealed deep opposition between industrialized countries and developing countries. All hope of coming to a successful conclusion in all of these problems has been sent to the Manila conference (Fifth UNCTAD) where the great confrontation in the north-south dialogue will take place in forthcoming months (beginning at the end of February 1979). The multilateral negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade [GATT] (Tokyo round) were suspended at the end of 1978 without the United States and the European community having been able to come to an agreement between them. On the other hand many bilateral agreements have been concluded between the principal economic partners in the world. However, no developing country has been included. The whole of the Third World has been pushed to one side.

In fact, out of the great international negotiations, only the convention on the European Economic Community and the ACP (Africa-Caribbean-Pacific) states, to which the great majority of African states belong, seems to be on a good track and offers good prospect of terminating in a new agreement in which each one of the parties will have been obliged to accept compromises and make concessions, but which should give an overall satisfaction to the whole of the ACP states.

This slow progress in the north-south dialogue can be explained in part by the differences in interest and by the differences in objectives within the group of industrialized countries. On the whole it can be explained by the difficulties deriving from the worldwide recession. This is even more agonizing for the developing countries since they have reasons to suspect a degree of neo-protectionism and suspect that the economic situation became worse for most of them in 1978.

Indebtedness Serious Problem

Africa, which is not immune to the common fate in this domain, finished the year of 1978 with an indebtedness which may possibly cause a slowing down in investments, a greater difficulty in finding the capital which it needs, and an evolution of the exchange rates which has been favorable to it. The exchange rates slow down its capacity for freeing the resources which are necessary both for the service of its debt and for financing its development.

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The indebtedness of the developing countries was at the center of the labors of UNCTAD in March of 1978. During recent years the official debt has increased at the rate of 20 percent per year and UNCTAD's figures show that for the countries that do not produce petroleum the service of their debts took on the average 25 percent of their exports in 1978. Partly for this reason the PVD [expansion unknown] have not been able to keep up their imports at the level desired in order to meet the needs of their development, and the rates of growth have fallen considerably below the objective of six percent which was established for development in the second decade of development. It fell to an average of 3.4 percent for the least advanced and most seriously affected countries, a category in which 22 African states are unfortunately classified.

The international community has come to the conclusion that the unusual deficit in current accounts for most of the PVD is not due to bad management of their domestic resources, nor to excessive expenses. It is rather induced from abroad by the double effect of inflation and of the worldwide recession.

This judgment on the whole of the PVD is applicable and is quite obviously valuable for Africa, whose overall indebtedness may be evaluated at around \$100 billion. UNCTAD's secretariat adds that the increase, really even the simple maintenance of the level of economic activity and of world trade, demands that the PVD deficit not be reabsorbed by slowing down interior development, but rather financed by a contribution of long-term capital according to appropriate conditions and modalities.

The financing that UNCTAD refers to can come from the great multilateral institutions like the EDF, the greater part of whose credits are reserved to Africa, or the World Bank Group. It is necessary to observe however that Africa's share in the loans and credits from the World Bank and from the International Development Association (the International Finance Corporation excluded) for the fiscal year that ended on 30 June 1978 (\$1.63 billion) is stationary in its absolute value and that it fell in relation to the 1976-1977 fiscal year from 23.14 percent to 19.4 percent. Africa is also profiting from a large contribution of capital under the title of bilateral aid, specifically from France.

Nevertheless it will still have to resort to financing from private sources at the rates of the financial market which are higher than the generally very liberal conditions of public aid loans for development, and consequently this will aggravate the service charges of the yearly payments. The African states are therefore constrained to adjust their borrowing to their capacity to assume the servicing of their agreements.

"Exchange Rates" Deteriorating

With few exceptions, most African states derive the larger part of their income from the export of basic products. While the cost of goods for construction, of intermediate products and of consumer goods increased at least

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at the rate of worldwide inflation, the general rate of increase of the prices of 37 basic products exported by the producing countries, established by the International Monetary Fund, at the end of 1978 had a real value slightly above the 1975 level, which was the same as in 1972. The figure of 100 corresponding to the period 1968-1970, the series of indicators is the following:

1971: 89	1975: 94
1972: 94	1976: 105
1973: 124	1977: 117
1974: 130	1978: 98

A much more detailed analysis of the evolution of raw material prices during the year of 1978 will be published (as they have been every year), in our forthcoming editions, as well as a rapid review of the economic evaluation of each of the African countries. In order to demonstrate the worsening of the evolution of the exchange rate to the detriment of Africa it is sufficient here to emphasize that the sale price indicator for copper (the most important source of export income for Zambia and Zaire) was the same in 1978, in real value, as in 1975 (the year which had recorded the lowest prices in the last two decades), as the price of raw materials of agricultural origin. At the end of 1978 these prices were at the level of the average for the period 1968-1970, still in real value. In the category of "beverages" the indicator, after having reached a peak in 1977 (indicator 244) because of the increase in Cacao prices and tea prices went down again in 1978 to indicator 158, or a decline from one year to the next of 36 percent.

In 1978, therefore, Africa resisted the danger of destabilization relatively well. Although it is still threatened by the two armed conflicts that are tearing it apart in its southern part and in the "Horn", it has been able to strengthen its cohesion by an ever closer collaboration within its regional and subregional organizations. At the same time, interior stability was strengthened in a good number of states and a tendency toward the return to more democratic systems of government was observed....

On the other hand, Africa suffered the consequences of a continuing decline in exchange rates at the same time that it continued to bear the weight of food imports and had to face an increase in the domestic demand for goods and services of all kinds. This made it extremely difficult or, in most cases impossible to achieve a balanced budget even in the petroleum-producing countries. Referring to the increase in the foreign debt the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa [ECA] could declare at Abbis Abbaba that 1978 had been the year of "insufficient development." In 1979, the non-oil-producing countries of Africa will have to bear an increase of 14.5 percent in the price of crude oil decided on by OPEC. It is still true that the producing countries, particularly the Arab states, have announced that they would devote credits approximately equivalent to the increase in the oil bill, based on the present value of the dollar, to development projects in the Third World.

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Africa will have a need for international solidarity in 1979 in order to come to the aid of the five million refugees victimized by its conflicts, in order to keep interior differences from degenerating to the point of becoming uncontrollable by Africa itself and in order to get for itself the indispensable resources for its development. It should be able to find that aid first in Europe, the continent which is closest to it both geographically and historically.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

UDEAC DISPUTE--The closed door sessions of the last UCEAD (Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa) on 19 and 21 December at Yaounde were at times stormy. Emperor Bokassa specifically accused Congo of trying to strangle his country by side-tracking the fuel that is shipped to it and which goes through the port of Pointe-Noire. President Yhombi Opanga suggested that the dispute be settled by the two interested parties. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Jan 79 p 24] 12,116

OAU-AMIN RELATIONS--Idi Amin shuffled the cards when spoke to the OAU one month before sending his troops against Tanzania, as he announced an imminent attack by Nyerere's army. Following his speech the OAU did not react to the Ugandan aggression. It was only at the moment of Tanzania's counter-offensive that one of the deputy secretaries of the organization suggested to Nyerere that he should officially alert the OAU, without success. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 19 Jan 79 p 24] 12,116

QADHDHAFI-AMIN SPLIT-- Uganda accuses Libya of having supplied arms to Tanzania. However, Libya has been considered for a long time as one of the principal allies of Idi Amin and his number one arms supplier. Uganda however has tried during recent months to come closer to Cairo and to certain moderate Arab capitals. And this is what has aroused the anger of Qadhdhafi. It was the Algerians, traditional friends of the Tanzanians, who got a change of attitude from Tripoli by asking for greater cohesion and a greater unity in the Hard-Line Front. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Jan 79 p 17] 12,116

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

WARNING ISSUED TO PORTUGAL--The Angolan minister of defense has just warned Lisbon in a communique against "the attitude of certain citizens prominent in Portuguese politics which seriously threatens the normalization desired by the two peoples." The minister of defense referred in this connection to the recent theft of a fishing vessel "by Portuguese individuals in the service of imperialist plotters, an incident which is a part of the oft-denounced plan for a widespread attack upon the People's Republic of Angola." "The campaign disparaging Angola, which is intensifying, is entirely hollow and only reflects the difficulties of its authors. That it finds support in South Africa, Senegal and certain Portuguese circles is not surprising," the minister of defense went on to say. "Their attitude, and that of other foreign circles, particularly that nostalgic for the Portuguese Democratic Social Party, only strengthens the determination of our people calmly to pursue the path established by the MPLA-Labor Party for the building of socialism in Angola and the total liberation of the African continent," the communique went on to say. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Jan 79 p 211] 5157

PETROLEUM AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE--An agreement was signed in Paris on 16 January by Total-CAP [African Oil Company] and the SONANGOL, the Angolan State Oil Company, represented by the Angolan oil minister, Mr Jorge de Morais, who was in the French capital from 15 to 17 January. Under the terms of this agreement, Total-CAP, an affiliate of the French Oil Company, is to invest 30 million dollars over five years in offshore oil prospecting. The maritime zone allocated to it covers 4,000 square kilometers. It will direct the work for the SONANGOL, within the framework of a production-sharing agreement. This is the first agreement signed by Angola with a foreign oil company in the prospecting sector. It should be noted that the agreement implicitly recognizes the importance of the prospecting work already done in the years 1960-1970 by the French Oil Company affiliate, representing investments which can be estimated at about 20 million dollars. It should also be noted that Mr Jorge de Morais met with a number of French leaders, among others Mr Albin Chalandon, president of the ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France]-Aquitaine company. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Jan 79 p 212] 5157

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BELGIAN PORT ASSISTANCE, TRAINING--Belgium has just signed two agreements with Angola pertaining to the expansion of the port of Lobito and the training of railroad personnel. The first of these agreements provides that initially, the Angolans will entrust the study of the conditions for the expansion of the port of Lobito and its economic impact on Angola to the Belgians. Once this study is completed, Belgium is committed to financing a part of the work to be done. In the railroad sector, the Belgian experts will train middle-level cadres and specialized railroad workers on the spot, and higher-level cadres in Belgium. These agreements are the first concrete results of a recent visit paid to Angola by a Belgian mission, which in turn was the result of a visit paid to Luanda last July by Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Henri Simonet. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Jan 79 p 212] 5157

UNITA BENGUELA CLAIMS DENIED--The Benguela railroad linking Lobito to Zaire and Zambia will not resume operations until there has been a settlement among the various disputing Angolan factions, a representative of the UNITA, Mr Jeremias Chitunda, said in London. Mr Chitunda recalled that the railroad, which formerly carried copper from Zambia and Zaire to Lobito, crosses an area 1,000 kilometers long controlled by the UNITA. Four bridges, he added, have not been repaired, and the UNITA opposes their repair so as to prevent the same from being used to transport Cuban troops. The UNITA does not have any plans to abandon this means of exerting economic pressure on President Agostinho Neto's Angolan government, he said. It would however be ready to talk with the Angolan chief of state and to allow the repair and resumption of service on the line provided that all Cuban troops are withdrawn from Angola, Mr Chitunda said in conclusion. A communique published by the Angolan minister of defense, on the other hand, said that the "minor sabotage" the groups infiltrated along the Benguela railroad line have succeeded in carrying out can in no way paralyze its operation. "It is operating, and with the technical aid to be received shortly, it will function even better." If the railroad line has not resumed the transport of products from Zaire and Zambia as yet, according to the minister, this is due solely to the fact that the contracts have not yet been agreed upon by the authorities of the three countries and the management of the company. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Jan 79 p 212] 5157

BRAZILIAN MEAT IMPORTS--Five hundred tons of dried meat have been loaded on the Angolan cargo vessel N'Gola in Sao Paulo, for shipment to Luanda. A spokesman for the A. Sola company, which is effecting the operation, explained that the 500 tons of dried meat are the first shipment of a 2,000-ton lot of this product sold to Angola. Three trucks and 17 trailers of the Scania Vabis make were also loaded on the vessel. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Jan 79 p 212] 5157

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REFUGEE PROBLEM LOOMS BIG--The population of the People's Republic of Angola totals 6,790,000. Of this total, almost a million persons are either refugees from other countries, Angolans repatriated after having fled to other countries, or displaced persons forced to leave their homes and villages. According to the refugee aid department, there are still 550,000 refugees in Zaire, 13,000 in Zambia, 7,000 in Portugal and 125 in Botswana. It is unknown how many of these will return to the country. To date, more than 340,000 Angolans have returned from Portugal, Congo-Brazzaville, Cape Verde, Zambia and Zaire. On the other hand, 250,000 citizens of Zaire and 30,000 Namibians have come as refugees to Angola. While the economy is not flourishing, the authorities in Luanda are making an effort to feed, lodge, and clothe these people and to integrate them in the structures of the young nation. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Feb 79 p 273] 5157

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CAMEROON

LAW REGULATING PETROLEUM TAXES, FOREIGN PARTICIPATION ADOPTED

Paris INDUSTRIES ET TRAVAUX D'OUTREMER in French Jan 79 p 28

[Text] The draft law establishing the new system of taxes and royalties on hydrocarbons and ores submitted to the legislative commission by the Cameroonian minister of mines and power was approved by the National Assembly on 11 December.

The reporter of the legislative commission had previously stressed the "prudence" of the United Republic of Cameroon in connection with the "policy pursued by the large oil producers," in view of the "negligible level" of their production and the "modesty of their reserves," for which reason the country "is in no hurry to join the OPEC."

The new legislation, according to the reporter, "asserts state ownership of the natural resources of the country." It specifies that the maximal percentage from which exploitation companies can benefit, taking the costs they incur into account, "can in no case exceed 60 percent."

The Cameroonian state "further reserves the right to at least 40 percent of the production of each company," consistent with the policy pursued by the leading countries dominating the international crude oil market. In addition, the state requires each concession-holder to guarantee the rapid filling of jobs on all levels with Cameroonian nationals, and also supervises production, transportation and the transfer abroad of the product of sales of Cameroonian crude oil.

For the mining taxes and royalties as a whole, the new measures provide for the concept in the future of "exploitation permits valid for four years," which can be granted in the event of the discovery of small deposits containing reserves which do not justify the granting of concessions for at least 25 years, as planned for more sizable deposits.

For example, an oil concession would pay overall a fixed duty of 250 million CFA francs for 25 years (10 million per year), representing the equivalent in oil of 10,000 tons, on production likely to vary between 500,000 and several million tons per year. In addition, production of a million tons per year would bring in 20 billion CFA francs. The AFP notes

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in passing that the exploitation of Cameroonian oil began in 1977 and came to about 800,000 tons in 1978.

Finally, the text of the law maintains the rate of 57.5 percent for the tax on companies, which rate is already included in various agreements signed by the government with certain oil companies allowed to function in the United Republic of Cameroon. According to the minister of mines and power, Cameroon has thus selected the "system of participation wherein the state joins with foreign companies for the exploitation of mining resources," and is "opposed to the principle of sterile nationalization."

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CAMEROON

BRIEFS

SWISS ASSISTANCE PROSPECTS--The Swiss minister of foreign affairs, Mr Pierre Aubert, paid an official visit to the United Republic of Cameroon from 18 to 20 January, meeting with President Ahidjo. Noting that this is the first time an official of the confederation has visited Africa while in office, the Swiss minister said that he came to discuss details of a number of cooperation projects in the realm of development and humanitarian aid. He also announced that he will be talking with business circles interested in investing in the United Republic of Cameroon as soon as he returns to Switzerland. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Jan 79 p 200] 5157

COFFEE STATISTICS--Last 31 December, domestic coffee purchases from the 1977-78 harvest total came to 64,352 tons, as compared to 61,715 tons from the 1976-77 harvest a year previously, i.e. a difference of more than 2,637 tons. Exports totaled 54,414 tons as of 31 December 1978, leaving a theoretical stock of 9,938 tons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Jan 79 p 200] 5157

COCOA STATISTICS--In the course of a reception held in early January, Minister of Agriculture Andze Tsoungui expressed his satisfaction with the results of the 1977-78 farm season. With a total yield of 115,000 tons as compared to 84,500 in 1976-77, the cacao crop showed an increase of 25 percent. Also, according to the minister, the prospects for the present season are promising. This increase in production is the result basically of the expansion of planted areas, but also and above all efficient organization in cooperatives. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Jan 79 p 200] 5157

FRENCH EQUIPMENT DONATION--Within the framework of the French Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC) plan for 1978, which covers six rural development projects coming to a total of 22,500,000 CFA francs, a gift of various farm implements (saws, wheelbarrows, building tools) has been made to the rural community of Bissaga, in the department of Upper Sanaga. This contribution should make it possible to build an 11-kilometer road. In addition, two 50-horsepower engines have also been delivered to the authorities, for use on a ferry which in the future will make the crossing of the Sanaga at this point possible. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Feb 79 p 260] 5157

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CHAD

RESULTS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION POLICY NOT ENCOURAGING

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Jan 79 pp 34-37

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima: "Hissein Habre's Challenge"]

[Text] President Felix Malloum and his prime minister
can stand one another less and less.

Friday afternoon 29 December 1978 accredited members of the diplomatic corps in Chad left the president's residence where they had taken part in the traditional ceremony of offering their best wishes. Their conversation was not devoted to the remarks President Malloum had made to them. On the contrary, the name of somebody who was not there was on everyone's lips. Head of the national unity government formed last August, Hissein Habre, the number-two man in the government according to the "basic charter" that is temporarily serving as a constitution, did not feel it worthwhile to take his place alongside the president for this official ceremony which, however, requires his presence. But that is not all. Over three-quarters of the ministers did not attend. These were mainly followers of Hissein Habre. Diplomats did not have to think about it for very long to reach the conclusion that the crisis that sets the country's two chief leaders against one another and which JEUNE AFRIQUE was the first to reveal 3 months ago (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 932) is getting worse. Those ambassadors who still hesitate to send reports in to their governments will see their last doubts removed as of the day after tomorrow.

The Gap Is Widening

On the afternoon of 30 December, in fact, the members of the government were supposed to go and offer their best wishes to the president. Most of the ministers were present at the residence. But once again, Hissein Habre, who was to talk in the name of the whole ministerial team he heads, was not there. There was nothing left for General Malloum to do but admit that the gap between his prime minister and himself is widening. The message he addressed to the nation on the occasion of the year-end festival was like a final warning to this partner: "The men responsible for applying the provisions of the basic charter must constantly bear in mind the notion

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of the higher interest of the nation. In the event of failure, no Chadian, regardless of his position in the machinery of government, will be pardoned."

The least that can be said is that coexistence between the two men is most difficult. In a few months time, incidents have multiplied at such a rate that the operation of institutions temporarily set up is practically paralyzed.

In November a particularly stormy Cabinet session was held which will remain famous in the annals of the country. All the more so since it happened in the presence of a Sudanese delegation that had come from Khartoum to offer its help to the protagonists.

Uncomfortable Situations

Felix Malloum and Hisssein Habre could not reach agreement on the procedure to be followed in freeing prisoners. The first of the two proposed that amnesty should first be granted only to those arrested under common law while the second demanded the freeing of political prisoners. General Malloum, who was to leave for a trip to France that same day, asked that the problem be postponed until a Cabinet meeting could be held on his return. Hisssein Habre refused to accept this solution, slammed the door of the Cabinet conference room and refused to go to the airport to say goodbye to the president.

Of course, 2 weeks later he headed the government welcoming committee for the president's return to the Chadian capital, but one could see that the two men barely shook hands without any show of enthusiasm and exchanged no words.

Therefore, Hisssein Habre is challenging Felix Malloum as if he wanted to prematurely take over or take precedence over him, but we do not really know what or who he expects to support him in doing so. As for President Malloum, he can only with difficulty get rid of the man who represents reconciliation with the northern provinces.

The two men are not in comfortable situations. While the choice of Hisssein Habre as prime minister on 29 August had somewhat surprised people, it nevertheless follows a certain kind of logic. Cast into the limelight by the vicissitudes of the Claustre Affair, the current prime minister was able to command a certain audience among the people of the north, where he comes from. Of all the leaders of the various rebel movements, it was he who grabbed the post offered by the N'Djamena Government and agreed to negotiate a reconciliation. Less free to pursue their initiatives because of the material and political support they benefit from from their respective protectors, Algeria and Libya, Abba Siddick and Goukouni Oueddei could not really negotiate and were obliged to withdraw into an intransigence that finally — temporarily? — put them out of the running. Rightly or wrongly, Hisssein Habre, today accused of regionalism, found himself referred to as a pure, hard-core nationalist. While offering a guarantee of

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opposition to Qadhafi's expansionist dreams, this was able to contribute toward acceleration of the process of national reconciliation. Five months later, the balance sheet is far from being encouraging.

Intransigence

A few sporadic massings of troops were, to be sure, effected. But even though the prime minister's troops and the Northern Armed Forces (FAN) recaptured the town of Arada in the prefecture of Biltine in early January, we must admit that the results obtained do not correspond to the hopes aroused by his choice. His intransigence makes collaboration difficult with officials from the south, largely in the majority in the country and who can tie up the administrative machinery when the country needs it most.

Under the pretext of correcting the regional imbalance inherited from colonial times to the advantage of the north, he ended up by provoking them to train their guns on him because he had ousted some of them in a more or less disguised way.

At the present time, any reconciliation with his former companion, Goukouni, seems far off. Moreover, were the latter to appear on the Chadian political scene, this would once again risk upsetting all the cards on the table.

Back to Back

This stymied situation does not help General Malloum any either. In August the Chadian president had to impose Hisssein Habre on the French, who did not want him, he assures us. He adds that the Chadian Army itself was hostile to the president's choice. So we can better understand his dilemma today.

If he should want to get rid of his burdensome prime minister, those who opposed his appointment would demand an accounting of him. But can he run the risk of letting the situation go to the dogs? In this scenario, would not Army hawks, headed by police boss, Wadal-Kamougue, former minister of foreign affairs, be tempted to intervene, thus forcing the two men to line up back to back? It is certainly not the few hundred troops of the FAN who continue to alone guarantee the prime minister's safety or who could resist the regular Army from which, it is true, they receive no orders.

But on the other hand, the possible ousting of Hisssein Habre could have serious consequences for the country's future. Even if the question of representation may seem debatable, at least the principle of distribution of power between the north and the south is now a gain. So we have to find an alternative. Is this possible under the present circumstances?

Chad's real problem is the establishment of a government strong enough to resist the jolts that for some time to come will go on shaking the country.

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Perhaps the error lies in concerning ourselves only with political matters while forgetting that administrative problems are at the source of the crisis the country has been exposed to for 15 years?

One of the men who in this connection might be turned to is Abdoulaye Lamana, who holds several trump cards. In such a divided country, he can boast of having relatives in the north as well as in the south. The fact that he is a Moslem could also be reassuring to Moslems concerned at seeing power taken over by Christians from the south. His touchy nationalism is a guarantee for those who fear a Libyan invasion.

Carries a Lot of Weight

Minister of planning and economy for many years, Abdoulaye Lamana combines the rigor of a good manager with the efficiency of a technocrat. His age (45) places him between two political generations: that of the independence era, first of all, which he participated in through his assumption of ministerial responsibilities under the Tombalbaye Regime, and that of today in which the experience he has acquired carries a lot of weight. Furthermore, it has been whispered about that France would not oppose his appointment to the post of prime minister. But would Abdoulaye Lamana accept given the current economic situation? This is not quite certain. At the time of the dealings that preceded the formation of the present government, he was contacted on several occasions. But he always turned down the ministerial portfolio offered him.

Waiting

For the time being, he prefers to go back to the business world. However, as a government official, he has to first get a release making him available for other occupations. But the government does not seem to be in any great hurry to grant it. On two occasions, he recently met with the prime minister, who has not given up getting him to go back on his decision. In his comfortable villa located in a popular section of N'Djamena, Abdoulaye Lamana confided to me that he had really for the moment decided to pull out. It is not that he has become indifferent to politics. But he wants to wait for the establishment of democracy before throwing his hat in the ring again. Perhaps he is waiting for the right moment. But we know that in politics one cannot always choose it.

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CHAD

BRIEFS

PETROLEUM RESOURCES—Chadian oil production will be operational by 1980. Of course, the Sedigi deposits, which are to be exploited by CONOCO (Continental Oil Company of Chad), are not very big. But they are big enough to meet all domestic needs. A refinery is to be built at N'Djamena with the aid of the World Bank, the RADEA (Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa) and the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation. Investments budgeted for its construction amount to about 4 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs and it will have an initial production capacity of 2,000 barrels a day. Given the distance separating the Chadian capital from the Sedigi deposits, a 365-km pipeline will be built. Its cost is estimated at 5 billion CFA francs. According to what the experts say, the Sedigi reserves are merely the tip of the iceberg. Some go so far as to assert that Chad is sitting on oil resources that will put it in the same class as Kuwait! More conservative estimates, however, place them at 20 million tons a year within a few years time. This unexpected gift from heaven will make it possible to raise per capita income which is at present one of the lowest in Africa. This black gold will also provide a much-needed spur to growth. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Jan 79 p 37] 11466

TWO INDEPENDENT ARMIES—The men who on 7 January took the town of Arada, 100 km north of Abeche, do not take their orders from the regular Chadian Army. This appears to be strange, but the commander of the Northern Armed Forces (FAN) takes his orders directly from Hisssein Habre. The basic charter provides for the gradual integration of FAN troops into the Chadian National Army in accordance with a schedule as yet to be set up. For the moment, it is an autonomous force that is evolving in its own way without being concerned for the existence of Gen Felix Malloum's troops. There is no coordination between the two armies. The prime minister is guarded by his own soldiers, whose uniform: a turban wrapped about the head and a battle dress reminiscent of a camouflage uniform, differs from that of the Army. The bulk of the troops is stationed at Abeche, under Hisssein Habre's control. But a few hundred soldiers are at N'Djamena where they provide the prime minister with protection. France was ready to accept a certain number of them for a retraining program. After agreeing to it, Hisssein Habre revoked his decision. His men have therefore not moved. Thus Chad offers the unprecedented spectacle of a country with two completely autonomous armies. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Jan 79 p 27] 11466

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COMORO ISLANDS

DISENCHANTMENT OF NEW LEADERS REPORTED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 5 Feb 79 p 19

[Article by Saikou Cheikh: "Archipelago Adrift"]

[Text] The insurgents put in power by Bob Denard knew what they no longer wanted. But they no longer know what they want.

The new Comoran leaders are beginning to be disenchanted. The country was without resources and the fate of its inhabitants hardly enviable during the time of Ali Soilih, the revolutionary leader who was overthrown and then assassinated last May. But he at least had a goal, a program, an attitude.

Eight months after the night landing of Bob Denard's men, the money expected from France or from the Islamic countries is not forthcoming.

To be sure, in order to meet the conditions dictated by Paris, formal ballots had to be hastily organized with the task of "legitimizing" vested power: Ahmed Abdallah was elected with 99.95 percent of the vote where -- one year earlier -- Ali Soilih had obtained only 55 percent. The same triumph took place for the not very laic constitution written in agreement with religious leaders. The elections for deputy seats were a little more contested, as is traditionally the case where a distribution of positions is involved. And, in particular, the designation of governors, who are the all-powerful rulers of each of the islands, gave rise to harsh struggles.

This is what has led worthy men -- whatever one may think of their attitude with respect to Ali Soilih's regime -- to enter into a veiled opposition. Thus Mouzaïr Abdallah, former minister of foreign affairs under Soilih, has refused all ministerial posts offered, going as far as to attempt to rally some of the young people. He has held illegal meetings, and did not fear having his name associated with the little demonstration held a few weeks ago in the form of a prayer meeting at the gravesite of the slain revolutionary.

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The former minister was even arrested for two days and then released, apparently under pressure from French diplomatic circles which are once more markedly present on the islands, and which see in him a possible successor. Ahmed Abdallah maintains that he is letting him act "so as not to give him too much importance;" but pressures exerted by Paris in connection with the security of Mouzaoir are some indication that the old Comoran chief no longer enjoys the full confidence of France which is giving much thought to the post-Abdallah situation.

One fact is of concern to both the French diplomats and the leaders of the Comoro Islands: young people, who were the main supporters of Soilih, are silent now. And for good reason: when their leaders on the People's National Committee were arrested, and power given back to the elders, their voice was brutally stifled. But their reawakening is going to be painful for the team in office.

The Race for Dollars

Certain clues lead one to think that this youthful fire is just smoldering. Witness the student strike which occurred last November: troops had to be called in. There was also the militant prayer at the grave of Ali Soilih -- a "fatiha" -- which resulted in 9 to 16 month jail sentences and fines for those responsible, for having prayed at the grave of a man considered as "non-Moslem."

The retaliatory measure against followers of the faith engaged in the peaceful invocation of Allah has shocked many a good Moslem in the Comoro Islands, as has the refusal of judicial authorities to provide food for the prisoners, even though the Koran prescribes it.

It would seem that, according to an already typical pattern, the proliferation of goodwill gestures in favor of strict islamism serves the main objective of extracting bundles of redeeming dollars from Saudi Arabia and the conservative emirates. And Ahmed Abdallah has just started on a tour of Gulf and Red Sea countries, where he can hold out his begging bowl -- an enterprise which Soilih had always rejected, especially if it meant that there would be accompanying pressures on the conduct of internal affairs.

It is true that pressure is the daily lot of the present leaders of the Comoro Islands. Their army is in the hands of French officers and non-commissioned officers who arrived beginning last October to take over from Bob Denard's mercenaries. Comoran officers are themselves mostly former ranked officers of the French army, whom Abdallah brought back with him in the aftermath of the coup. The same goes for five recently appointed ministers, said to have been practicing medicine for 10 years or more... but, in France!

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Things Going Well for Bob Denard

According to consistent testimony, Bob Denard would appear to still be in France, where he divides his time between Paris -- headquarters of the Comoro diplomatic representation -- and Bordeaux, where he has family and friends. Christian Olageray, a French garage owner who had prepared the way for the mercenary, has joined him in that city: he was arrested for two days in early January, in Moroni, as a result of denunciations. He was being suspected of wanting to "liquidate" Ahmed Abdallah at the time.

Bob Denard intervened, from France, demanding the release of his friend. The notorious mercenary is now himself engaging in commercial operations between France and the Comoro Islands, sometimes acting in contradiction with the Moroni government... which is complaining against him by now. But, one makes friends where one finds them...

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GABON

BRIEFS

COFFEE STATISTICS--In the course of a meeting of the Coffee Price Stabilization Fund held in Libreville on 16 January, it was reported that Gabonese coffee production totaled 600 tons of *Coffea robusta* in 1977-78, the greater part of which was of poor quality. The fund had a turnover of 92 million CFA francs, with 200 tons of this production being exported. The budget for the fund for 1978-79, coming mainly from state subsidies, is balanced, for income and expenditures, at 345 million CFA francs. This will make it possible to carry out a program of direct action in favor of coffee production. Let us recall that the purchase price paid to the producer per kilogram of coffee increased to 120 CFA francs in 1977 and then 160 in 1978, after having stayed at 50 CFA francs for 10 years. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Feb 79 p 263] 5157

OWENDO, PORT-GENTIL PORT IMPROVEMENTS--A ministerial delegation headed by Minister of State for Transports Georges Rawiri visited the timber port of Owendo and the port under construction at Port-Gentil on 22 January. Their purpose was to inspect the progress on the work at the two ports which are scheduled to be commissioned this year. The timber port of Owendo, which has two platforms, was planned to make possible the storage of 1,250 tons of floating timber, while the deep-water port in Port-Gentil will make it possible for five or six vessels, depending on the tonnage, to be moored at the docks. The cost of the work to be done at Owendo is estimated at 12.75 billion CFA francs, while the port at Port-Gentil will cost 10.5 billion CFA francs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Feb 79 p 263] 5157

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GHANA

BRIEFS

FOREIGN LOAN INQUIRY COMMITTEE--The Supreme Military Council has established an investigation commission to make a detailed study of all the foreign loans for which the Ministry of Finance contracted between June 1977 and July 1978, i.e. the last year of financial activity for Lieutenant General Acheampong. In particular, the commission is to question and bring together to confront each other the former and the new commissioners for finance, M. A. K. Appiah and Colonel E. T. Oklah, respectively; the former and the new commissioners for economic planning, Mr Robert Gardiner and Dr Joseph Abbey, respectively; the former commissioner for justice, Mr Gustave Korenteng-Addow; the commissioner for trade, Col K. A. Quarshie, and the governor of the Bank of Ghana, M. A. E. K. Ashiagbor. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Feb 79 p 257] 5157

RAILROAD SUBSIDY FOLLOWING STRIKE--The government of Ghana has approved a monthly supplementary subsidy of 1.1 million cedis for the national railroad company, increasing the total of that subsidy to 3 million. This decision was made after the long 15-day railroad workers' strike which ended on 17 January. The strike, called by the railroad workers because of wage and labor conditions demands, is believed to have cost the railroad company some 80,000 cedis per day, mainly because of the spoilage of perishable goods. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Feb 79 p 257] 5157

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

OFFICIAL'S INTERIM APPOINTMENT--Guinean Minister of Mines and Geology Ibrahima Kabassan Keita was appointed interim minister of public works, urbanism and habitat on 15 January. He is replacing Mr Mohamed Lamine Toure, who has just been elected secretary-general of the International Bauxite Association (IBA). Also, Mr Diao, formerly director of information in Conakry, has been appointed Guinean ambassador to Libya. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Feb 79 p 253] 5157

PRC-GUINEA TRADE AGREEMENT--China and Guinea signed the protocol for a trade agreement for this year on 17 January in Conakry. The terms of this agreement which pertains to farm products on the one hand, and food, industrial and chemical products on the other, were defined at the completion of the six-day visit paid to Guinea by a Chinese government and trade delegation. The protocol was signed by Guinean Minister of Exchanges Domain El Hadj Abdoulaye Toure and Chinese First Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade Cho Hua-min. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Jan 79 p 193] 5157

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MADAGASCAR

RATSIRAKA WORRIED BY THREATS TO NATION'S SECURITY

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 5 Feb 79 p 23

[Article by Elie Ramaro: "Ratsiraka's Doubts"]

[Text] Facing the perils which loom on the horizon, Madagascar finds itself forced to strengthen its security.

In Malagasy governmental circles, doubt persists concerning the sincerity of Western intentions with regard to current major problems. Recently, while receiving diplomats in office and representatives of national institutions in Antananarivo, President Didier Ratsiraka expressed to them the following:

"Do they really desire peace," he wondered, "when they are establishing military bases dozens of thousands of miles away from their national territory (like Diego Garcia); when they express token condemnation of Ian Smith while inviting him and arming him, the better to massacre Zimbabwe's black population; and when they refuse economic sanctions against Pretoria while providing it in massive amounts with the arms which will enable the white minority to further oppress the large black masses, to perpetrate its prevarication in Namibia, and to constantly engage in aggression against socialist Angola and Mozambique?"

The issue of human rights, which is being so stirred up these days in western capitals, also strikes Malagasy leaders as an abuse of language. President Ratsiraka, who challenges "the bourgeois notion of human rights based on the cult of the individual," wondered how governments "which bear responsibility for using the atom bomb against innocent civilians" and which "fabricated the Zionist state out of whole cloth while holding in contempt the Palestinian people's right to exist" can now "presume to include in international conventions the notion of human rights which they have lightheartedly mocked elsewhere."

The bitterness which can be seen in the Malagasy revolution leader's statements can be easily understood. For example, it is because of the West's accommodating attitude toward South Africa -- the latter posing a

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permanent threat to the security of Madagascar -- that the Malagasy government has resolved in recent months to organize aerial defense: military aviation, which until the end of 1978 had only a few old-fashioned transport aircraft available, is now using a Mig-17 squadron put at its disposal by North Korea (*). These fighters and their pilots are on loan pending delivery of the Mig-21 planes on order from the Soviet Union, and the training of Malagasy pilots now being conducted.

This was a reluctantly made decision: Madagascar, grappling with a deep transformation of its economy and social structure, would have liked to devote all of its resources to these projects, which are very taxing as it is for a country so lacking in means. Thus, significant efforts are going to be accepted this year to improve the situation in the vital sectors of transportation and food supplies: the railroads, parts of whose system date back to the time of General Gallieni, are going to be modernized; the same will hold true for coastal ports and ships.

With the same concern for strengthening its own security, the Malagasy government would like the swiftest possible settlement for the throbbing question of the islets scattered around the main island: Basses-de-India, Juan de Nova, the Gloriosos Islands, or Europa, which lie at the limit of Madagascar territorial waters, or are included within its 200 mile limit of economic exclusivity, are presently occupied by French meteorologists or paratroopers, and could be equipped with military means of surveillance or offensive.

Antananarivo is insistently demanding the restitution of these islets which were annexed by French sailors or traders beginning in the 17th century, and later connected to the colony of Madagascar. But Paris, with support from the lobby of colonization nostalgia now in retreat on Reunion Island, is offering some resistance.

The Democratic Republic of Madagascar has therefore requested the establishment of an OAU committee of inquiry, so as to associate the African community in the settlement of this problem of liberation of territories still under colonial tutelage.

(*) Cooperation between Madagascar and North Korea has developed steadily, particularly since 1974. It is primarily civilian: there has been technical assistance in operation of cooperatives and establishment of a rural bank; preparation of ricefields and tractor donations; construction of dams and hydroelectric plants; installation of a prefabricated housing plant, and so on. Last 3 January, in Tamatave, President Ratsiraka inaugurated a "Palace for Pioneer Children," offered by North Korea, and which can receive 20,000 children each year.

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MALI

BRIEFS

UDPM CONGRESS ANNOUNCED--Just prior to presiding at the ceremonies held on 20 January to celebrate the 18th anniversary of the founding of the Malian army, the Malian chief of state, Gen Moussa Traore, announced the scheduling of the study process and the constituent congress of the Democratic Union of the Malian People (UDPM), the single and constitutional party of the country, for 15-17 February and 28-31 March 1979, respectively. The draft bylaws and internal regulations for this political body just being created will be discussed and amended according to the "democratic process" by the base cells, as provided by the 1974 constitution. General Traore answered those wondering about a return not only to constitutional life but to a civilian regime as well as follows: "Since Mali won its independence in 1960, Malian soldiers have been in the same camp as the civilians The Malian soldier has never doubted for a single moment that he is the product of the people, and this explains the events of 1968," i.e. the military coup d'etat which put the present regime in power. The establishment of the UDPM represents a "crucial phase in the life of the country," in the words of the chief of state. It marks the imminent "return to a normal constitutional life" which will occur this year. On the subject of the "purge" of the army ranks, General Traore gave assurance that the main leaders of the 28 February 1978 plot, Minister of Defense Kissima Doukara, former Minister of Transport and Public Works Karim Dembele, and former Security Department Head Tiecoro Bagayoko, will be brought before the courts before the constituent congress of the future party. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Jan 79 p 193] 5157

NONGOVERNMENTAL BELGIAN ASSISTANCE--An agreement calling for a sum of 575 million Malian francs for the development of a gypsum quarry in Tessali (in the Gao region in the northeastern part of Mali) was signed on 18 January in Bamako by the Malian government and a Belgian non-governmental body, Terre ASBL [non-profit organization]. The agreement, which comes within the framework of the aid being offered by that organization to the countries in the process of development, will make it possible to exploit the assets of gypsum deposits in a neglected part of Mali. According to a plan which will cover six years, the estimated production of the industrial unit will gradually be increased from 300 tons in 1979 to 12,000 tons per year, according to Malian Minister of Industrial Development and Tourism Lamine Keita, who signed the agreement on behalf of his country. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Jan 79 p 193] 5157

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

BEIRA PORT IMPROVEMENT--Construction work on a new fishing wharf in the port of Beira will last all this year, ending next December. The cost is estimated at 211,000 contos. The new wharf will be 434 meters long. Vessels with a draft of 30 meters will be able to dock there. Plans call for the building of a ramp for ship repairs and the installation of a five-ton crane. Beside the wharf there will be a water area measuring 200 by 100 meters to allow vessels to maneuver, and an embankment zone (access to the wharf), where auxiliary installations will be built (cold storage facilities, ice plants, canneries, filet processing industries, etc). Other projects are planned for the port of Beira. They include, among other things, the building very soon of a wharf with 300 meters of dock space and a terminal at wharf number 10. There are also studies underway, one on access routes to the port and the others, being made by Korean experts, on the domestic railroad network. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Jan 79 p 212] 5157

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TOGO

BRIEFS

CUBAN DELEGATION--The president of the Togolese Republic met with a Cuban delegation headed by Mr Oscar Ora Mas Oliva, chief of staff at the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations, on 18 January. "We discussed the means making the development of relations between our two countries possible with the Togolese chief of state," Mr Oliva said. "We also discussed the summit meeting of non-aligned countries which will be held in Havana this year." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Jan 79 p 198] 5157

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UGANDA

INTERNATIONAL REALIGNMENTS SEEN AS PERILOUS FOR AMIN REGIME

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Feb 79 p 22

[Article by Marc Yared: "Idi Amin: the Beginning of the End? His Former Soviet and Libyan Allies Spurn Him. All Africa Disavows Him"]

[Text] Dozens of people have been killed in the shooting that has been going on in Kampala since 4 February. Squads of Ugandan oppositionist commandos, partisans of former Head of State Milton Obote, who has been a refugee in Tanzania since 1971, have destroyed an electric power plant and set fire to an oil storage tank.

Meanwhile, Tanzanian forces are continuing to advance into Ugandan territory with the avowed purpose of "causing the fall of dictator Amin." Since their counteroffensive was launched at the end of January, Tanzanian troops have destroyed or captured a dozen armored vehicles, shot down 3 enemy planes and besieged several towns: Mutukula, Minzino, Kakuntu and others.

The spectacular about-face of Libya and the Soviet Union in favor of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere has emphasized not only the deterioration of the military situation in the last few weeks but also Uganda's economic and diplomatic condition. Not only is Libya no longer supplying Idi Amin's regime with cash and oil, it is also said to have delivered arms to Tanzania. As for the Kremlin, which outfitted the entire Ugandan air force, it has a military mission in Dar-es-Salaam that is supposed to train Tanzanian flight crews in Mig's.

How can the Soviet and Libyan change of attitude toward Uganda be explained? Colonel Qaddhafi, who was unstinting of his support for Idi Amin in the first Uganda-Tanzania confrontation in 1972, is said to be furious at the Ugandan head of state's visit to President Anwar Sadat at the end of October. After this meeting, the master of Kampala became the advocate of the "spirit of Camp David" and the policy of reconciliation between Egypt and Israel.

Disagreement in Tripoli

There is another factor that Tripoli and Moscow have not been unaware of: the support of President Nyerere by public opinion and most African governments, especially those of the "front-line" nations that are opposed to the segregationist regimes of southern Africa. With a few exceptions, Africa south of the Sahara makes no secret of disavowing the Ugandan president, who

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has infringed upon the territorial integrity of a neighboring country in defiance of the charter of the OAU [Organization of African Unity].

These elements have no doubt played a part, along with Libya's and the Soviet Union's sympathy for the Tanzanian socialist system, although the humanitarian socialism advocated by Julius Nyerere is hard to reconcile with the communism of Mr Leonid Brezhnev or the Islamic democracy of Colonel Qaddhafi.

But that is not the most important thing. Rather, the Soviet Union has always courted Dar-es-Salaam because it was aware of Tanzania's importance and of the influence of its diplomacy in the Indian ocean and southern Africa.

Moscow's Intervention

However, Julius Nyerere, who is ideologically close to Maoist China and is culturally linked to the English-speaking West, has been careful for a long time to keep his distance from the Kremlin.

Here, as in the Horn of Africa, war has enabled the Soviet Union to make a spectacular comeback. Tanzania today, as Ethiopia yesterday, has no other resources than the military materiel offered by Moscow to confront its neighbor. Libya, in agreement with the USSR, is snubbing Islamic solidarity, abandoning Idi Amin (as it did Somali President Siad Barre) in order to convoy arms to Tanzania and furnish it with subsidies necessary for the war effort.

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